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I. Introduction
In a forthcoming article in the Washington and Lee Law
Review,1 Gregory Dolin and Irina Manta argue that the LeahySmith America Invents Act (AIA),2 the cornerstone of modern
patent reform, effectuates a “taking” within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment by depriving patent owners of the economic
value of their patents without compensating them for these
∗ Fellow at the Center for Technology, Innovation and Competition,
University of Pennsylvania Law School and Visiting Fellow at the Information
Society Project, Yale Law School.
∗∗ J.D. Candidate, Class of 2016, Yale Law School and Student Fellow at
the Information Society Project, Yale Law School. Thanks to Dmitry Karshtedt
for helpful comments and to Boris Bindman, Emily Tichenor, and the other
members of the Washington and Lee Law Review for exceptional editing. All
errors are ours.
1. Gregory Dolin & Irina D. Manta, Taking Patents, 72 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. (forthcoming 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
2. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, §§ 6, 18, 125
Stat. 284, 299–311, 329–31 (2011) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–19,
321–29, 321 note (2012)).
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losses.3 Specifically, they contend, the AIA’s creation of inter
partes review (IPR) and covered business method review (CBMR)
proceedings significantly interfered with patentees’ “reasonable
investment-backed expectations” by increasing the likelihood that
their patents would be found invalid.4 As evidence, the authors
point to high invalidation rates in IPR and CBMR proceedings5
and the strong negative effect of some IPR filings on patentees’
stock prices. According to their theory, “a mere IPR
request . . . has significant effects on the underlying value of the
patent and even on the price of the stock of the company that
owns the patent.”6
Dolin and Manta’s article is a provocative invitation to
consider Congress’s constitutional authority to pass legislation
that decreases the value of issued patents. While the precise
contours of this authority are unclear, we are ultimately
unpersuaded that the AIA effectuates a taking. First, the authors’
premise that patents are property rights protected by the Takings
Clause is far less clear than they contend. Although we agree that
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4. Dolin & Manta, supra note 1 (manuscript at 65–66). CBMR is itself a
variation of post-grant review (PGR), a third type of proceeding created by the
AIA. For discussion of Dolin and Manta’s arguments regarding the differences
between AIA’s post-issuance proceedings and other administrative proceedings
for challenging patent validity, see infra Part IV.
5. The new IPR and CBMR proceedings have a higher invalidation rate
than either litigation or pre-AIA proceedings. See Dolin & Manta, supra note 1
(manuscript at 31–36); see also Gregory Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, 56 B.C.
L. REV. 881, 924–27 (2015). For current statistics on IPRs and CBMRs, see
PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD STATISTICS, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Feb.
29,
2016),
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016-229%20PTAB.pdf.
6. See Dolin & Manta, supra note 1 (manuscript at 60, 31–36). The
authors also cite the opinion of Richard Baker, President of New England
Intellectual Property, LLC, who estimates that “because of the AIA” the value of
patents has dropped by two thirds, “with a further drop of 10-15% expected in
the next few years.” Id. (manuscript at 64–65) (citing Richard Baker, America
Invents Act Cost the US Economy over $1 Trillion, PATENTLY-O (June 8,
2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/06/america-invents-trillion.html). Many
might balk at such estimates and remain skeptical of Dolin and Manta’s
contention that the procedures adopted by the AIA have had, and will continue
to have, “a serious effect on the value of patents to their owners.” Dolin &
Manta, supra note 1 (manuscript at 5). Nevertheless, given the difficulty of
assessing the authors’ empirical claims, we concentrate instead on the legal
aspects of their argument.
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this proposition is theoretically and legally defensible, the
relevant precedents are hardly decisive.
Second, courts are unlikely to view IPR and CBMR
proceedings as the kinds of government actions governed by the
Takings Clause. Courts assessing constitutional challenges under
the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment tend to distinguish actions
intended to cure defects in government administrative systems
from incursions on property rights. Indeed, the Federal Circuit
rejected a challenge to IPR’s predecessor based partly on this
distinction. We see little reason that a court would reach a
different conclusion today.
Third, Dolin and Manta arguably overstate the extent to
which
the
AIA
affected
patentees’ investment-backed
expectations. As they acknowledge, the AIA was enacted against
a background of federal statutes and regulations that authorize
challenges to patent validity, both through administrative review
and through litigation, or otherwise limit patentees’ ability to
exploit patents and patented inventions. These laws, like the
AIA, affected the value of issued patents. Within this
environment, patentees could arguably foresee that the
government would continue to actively regulate patent rights.
Together, these arguments persuade us that the AIA does
not effectuate a taking. Nevertheless, Dolin and Manta’s analysis
offers an engaging and important discussion on the constitutional
implications of patent reform.
II. Patents’ Uncertain Status Under the Takings Clause
Whether the AIA effectuated a taking depends on whether
patents are “property” for purposes of the Takings Clause. As
Dolin and Manta acknowledge, the question is the object of
intense scholarly debate.7 Nevertheless, they conclude, “Judicial
precedent and statutory analysis quite clearly support the
proposition that patents are property.”8 We believe that this
7. See Dolin & Manta, supra note 1 (manuscript at 49–51).
8. Id. (manuscript at 51) (quoting Joshua I. Miller, 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a)
and the Unconstitutional Taking of Property, 13 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 18 (2010)).
Dolin and Manta’s analysis of precedent tracks Joshua Miller’s analysis of the
history of 28 U.S.C. § 1498, which grants the Court of Federal Claims
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proposition is defensible but disagree that it is clearly
established.
The Fifth Amendment unquestionably protects patents. The
scope of that protection is, however, unclear. The Supreme Court
has explained that patents are protected “property” under the
Due Process Clause. But in contrast with trade secrets,9 the
Court has never held that patents are property under the
Takings Clause. In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,10 the Court stated that
patents are “surely included within the ‘property’ of which no
person may be deprived by a State without due process of law.”11
Nevertheless, the Court declined to rule on patents’ status under
the Takings Clause. In that case, College Savings Bank argued
that the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy
Clarification Act,12 which purported to abrogate states’ sovereign
immunity to patent infringement liability, was a valid exercise of
Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment powers because state patent
infringement constituted an uncompensated taking.13 The Court
withheld judgment, holding instead that the Act was not
intended to remedy takings violations.14 The Court neither
accepted nor rejected the possibility that government
infringement could constitute a taking.15

jurisdiction to hear claims for patent infringement against the United States
and its contractors.
9. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003–04 (1984).
10. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
11. Id. at 642.
12. 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296(a) (2012).
13. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. at 641–42.
14. See id. at 641–42 & n.7.
15. See id. The view that patents are protected under the Due Process
Clause but not the Takings Clause has some support in the Supreme Court’s
Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. As Davida Isaacs argues, the Court’s modern
precedents distinguish between federally created benefits, protected by the Due
Process Clause, and other forms of property protected by the Takings Clause.
Like the government benefits at issue in these cases, patents are federal
creations and are arguably entitled to the former’s narrower protections. See
Davida H. Isaacs, Not All Property Is Created Equal: Why Modern Courts Resist
Applying the Takings Clause to Patents, and Why They Are Right To Do So, 15
GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 36–41 (2007) (citing Bowen v. Gillard, 483 U.S. 587
(1987); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)).
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Dolin and Manta argue that the Supreme Court’s recent decision
in Horne v. Department of Agriculture16 “left no doubt” that
“patents are subject to the Takings Clause.”17 We disagree. In
Horne, the Court held that the government could not order raisin
growers to set aside a certain percentage of their crop without
receiving just compensation.18 To support its conclusion that the
Takings Clause protects real and personal property equally, the
Court quoted language from James v. Campbell,19 a
nineteenth-century decision in which the Court compared
government appropriation of patents to appropriation of real
property:
[A patent] confers upon the patentee an exclusive property in
the patented invention which cannot be appropriated or used
by the government itself, without just compensation, any more
than it can appropriate or use without compensation land
which has been patented to a private purchaser.20

Superficially, Horne endorses Dolin and Manta’s assessment
that patents are property under the Takings Clause. Horne’s
precedential status, however, is doubtful. First, Horne’s
discussion of patents and real property is not controlling; the
discussion was neither essential to the Court’s holding nor briefed
or argued by the parties.21 Second, James, the source of this
comparison, itself has extremely limited precedential value.
James’s discussion of patent takings was dicta,22 and twelve
16. 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).
17. Dolin & Manta, supra note 1 (manuscript at 52).
18. See Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2427; see also Dolin & Manta, supra note 1
(manuscript at 47).
19. 104 U.S. 356 (1882).
20. Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2427 (quoting Campbell, 104 U.S. at 358
(alterations in original)).
21. See Brief for Petitioners, Horne, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (No. 14-275); Brief for
the Respondent, Horne, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (No. 14-275); Transcript of Oral
Argument, Horne, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (No. 14-275).
22. Adam Mossoff, who has discussed nineteenth-century takings law cases
at length, observes that even though the Supreme Court’s statement in James
was dicta, the lower court’s opinion had held in favor of the patentee against the
government based on the Takings Clause. See Adam Mossoff, Patents as
Constitutional Private Property: The Historical Protection of Patents Under the
Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689, 697, 709 (2007). Specifically, the lower
court held that the government was not immune from suit for patent
infringement based on sovereign immunity because a patent, “like all other
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years later, in Schillinger v. United States,23 the Supreme Court
cast doubt on James’s conclusion that patents “cannot be
appropriated or used by the government . . . without just
compensation.”24
In Schillinger, the Court held that the Court of Claims did
not have jurisdiction to hear a claim against the government for
patent infringement.25 At that time, the court’s jurisdictional
statute authorized the court to hear “claims founded upon the
constitution” but not those “sounding in tort.”26 Accordingly, the
Court held that the patentee could not recover. Justice Harlan
dissented, citing James’s statement that a patented invention
“cannot be appropriated or used by the government itself, without
just compensation”27—but to no avail.
Subsequently, in Zoltek Corp. v. United States,28 the Federal
Circuit held that a patentee could not bring an action in the
Court of Federal Claims, the Court of Claims’s successor, alleging
that the government’s infringement of a patent constituted a
Fifth Amendment taking.29 Between Schillinger and Zoltek,
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1498, which authorizes the Court of
Federal Claims to hear claims for patent infringement against

private property recognized by law, [was] exempt from being taken for public
use without just compensations, by the supreme law of the land.” Campbell v.
James, 4 F. Cas. 1168, 1172 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879) (No. 2,361). Thereafter, the
government prevailed by convincing the Supreme Court that the patent was
invalid. See James, 104 U.S. at 382–83. More broadly, Mossoff documents that,
even if the Supreme Court has not held unequivocally that government patent
takings are compensable under the Takings Clause, some courts in the
nineteenth century appeared quite comfortable with the notion that patents
could be taken like other forms of property. See Mossoff, supra, at 719 (citing
several nineteenth-century federal cases, including McKeever v. United States,
14 Ct. Cl. 396 (1878), and the lower court’s decision in Campbell, applying
traditional property reasoning to patents and concluding that patentees should
have the right to sue under the Takings Clause if the federal government made
an unauthorized use of a patented invention).
23. 155 U.S. 163 (1894).
24. Id. at 173 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Campbell, 104 U.S. at 358).
25. See id. at 167–70.
26. Id. at 167 (quoting Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 359, § 1, 24 Stat. 505).
27. Id. at 173.
28. 442 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (per curiam), vacated, 672 F.3d 1309,
1314–22 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc).
29. See id. at 1353.
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the federal government and its contractors.30 Citing Schillinger’s
rule that an action for patent infringement sounds in tort, the
court held that § 1498 provided the only means of recovery and
that the patentee could not bring its claim under the Takings
Clause.31 Given the Supreme Court’s decision not to review
Zoltek,32 we believe it unlikely that Horne overruled Schillinger
sub silentio.
Of course, as Dolin and Manta argue, Schillinger and Zoltek
are not decisive. First, the Federal Circuit subsequently vacated
its Zoltek decision on other grounds, and the court’s revised
opinion declined to reach the question of the United States’s
liability for patent infringement under the Takings Clause.33
Second, these cases do not necessarily establish that patents can
never be subject to takings. As Dolin and Manta put it, “The rule
of law announced in [Schillinger and Zoltek] is simply not that
broad.”34 Although those cases might govern government
infringement of patent rights, other, more “drastic” adjustments
of patent rights might qualify.35
30. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2012)
Whenever an invention described in and covered by a patent of the
United States is used or manufactured by or for the United States
without license of the owner thereof or lawful right . . . the owner’s
remedy shall be by action against the United States in the United
States Court of Federal Claims for . . . reasonable and entire
compensation.
For a brief history of § 1498 and its predecessor, see Sean M. O’Connor, Taking,
Tort, or Crown Right? The Confused Early History of Government Patent Policy,
12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 145, 183–98 (2012).
31. See Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1350–53.
32. Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 551 U.S. 1113 (2007).
33. The Federal Circuit’s original decision held that § 1498 only applied to
government actions that would create liability for direct infringement under 35
U.S.C. § 271(a). See Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1360. The court subsequently concluded
that this holding was erroneous and that § 1498 also applied to actions
equivalent to indirect liability under § 271(g). See Zoltek, 672 F.3d at 1314–22.
Accordingly, the court determined that the patentee’s complaint stated a claim
under § 1498. See id. at 1323–26. The court decided that it was unnecessary to
address whether the patentee could bring a claim under the Takings Clause. See
id. at 1327.
34. Dolin & Manta, supra note 1 (manuscript at 53).
35. Id. (manuscript at 53–54). Nevertheless, if patents are categorically not
property under the Takings Clause, as some readings of Schillinger and Zoltek
might suggest, the extent to which the government action affects patent values
might be irrelevant.
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Indeed, on the scale of government intrusions on patentees’
rights, infringement is arguably not the most severe. Government
infringement effectively creates a compulsory license for the
government, and “all the other attributes of ownership” remain
“with the patentee.”36 In contrast, Dolin and Manta write, the
AIA “changed the scope of patent rights themselves” by
subjecting issued patents to more stringent forms of adversarial
post-issuance review and significantly reducing the value of those
patents.37 In theory, this might effectuate a taking that, absent
just compensation, is unconstitutional.38
III. Takings Versus “Curative Statutes”
Furthermore, even if patents are property rights under the
Takings Clause,39 courts are unlikely to view IPR and CBMR
proceedings as the kind of government actions that the Clause
governs. The authors cite no precedent for the conclusion that a
government action designed to ensure the validity of property
rights, intangible or otherwise, can constitute a taking.40 Is such
an action a taking? Or does it merely ensure that property
boundaries are accurate? In Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff,41 the
Federal Circuit suggested the latter.42
In Patlex, the Federal Circuit rejected a Fifth Amendment
challenge to the ex parte reexamination statute.43 The Bayh–Dole
36. Id. (manuscript at 55).
37. Id.
38. See id. Dolin and Manta also suggest that the AIA may be a taking
under a breach of implied contract theory. Patents, they argue, are commonly
conceived as a contract between the patentee and the government in which the
government grants a patent in exchange for disclosure of the patented
invention. Id. (manuscript at 54). This argument is doubtful, however. Courts
have only invoked implied contract as an analogy for describing the purpose of
the patent system, not as a legal theory. Further, Schillinger and Zoltek suggest
that an infringement claim against the government, at least, necessarily sounds
in tort and is not compensable as a taking.
39. See supra Part II.
40. See Dolin & Manta, supra note 1 (manuscript at 62).
41. 758 F.2d 594 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
42. See id. at 602–03.
43. See id. at 603. Patlex styled its claim as a Takings Clause challenge.
See id. at 600–03. As explained below, however, the court treated that claim
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Act established procedures that parties could use to challenge the
validity of issued patents, including those issued before the Act
was enacted.44 The plaintiff argued that the Act’s retroactive
application unfairly encroached on constitutionally protected
patent rights.45 The court disagreed, holding that the “overriding
public purposes Congress articulated in enacting the
reexamination law with retroactive effect” outweighed any
“hardship” suffered by the patentee.46
Dolin and Manta dismiss Patlex for two reasons. First, they
note, the Federal Circuit’s decision turned on Congress’s “public
purposes” for enacting the reexamination statute.47 The Supreme
Court subsequently clarified, however, that this approach is only
proper under the Due Process Clause, not the Takings Clause.48
Second, they argue IPR and CBMR proceedings “are
fundamentally different” from the ex parte reexamination system
at issue in Patlex.49
As we explain below, we doubt that the differences between
IPR and CBMR and reexamination proceedings are significant
enough to make a constitutional difference.50 Moreover, Patlex
presents a fundamental difficulty for Dolin and Manta’s
argument, despite the Supreme Court’s abandonment of the
“public purposes” approach, because it casts doubt on the
conclusion that post-issuance review proceedings can constitute a
taking at all. In Patlex, the court explained that the
reexamination statute belonged to “the class of ‘curative’ statutes,
designed to cure defects in an administrative system.”51 The court

much as a modern court would treat a claim brought under the Due Process
Clause. See infra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.
44. See Bayh–Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 1, 94 Stat. 3015, 3015–17
(1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 302–07 (2012)).
45. See Patlex, 758 F.2d at 596 (“The issue is whether [the retroactive
effect] of the patent reexamination statute and implementing regulations are in
violation of [several constitutional provisions].”). For the contentious history of
the first reexamination procedure, see Dolin, supra note 6, at 899–902.
46. Patlex, 758 F.2d at 602–03.
47. See Dolin & Manta, supra note 1 (manuscript at 57–58).
48. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 532, 540–45 (2005).
49. Dolin & Manta, supra note 1 (manuscript at 58).
50. Infra Part IV.
51. Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 603 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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noted that other courts have treated curative statutes favorably,
even when applied retroactively.52
IPR and CBMR proceedings likewise fall into this class of
curative statutes that simply do not seem like the subject matter
of a Fifth Amendment taking. Far from depriving patentees of
vested rights for some public use, IPR and CBMR proceedings
ensure that patents issued by the government to private parties
are valid.53 Thus, while Patlex’s references to “public purposes”
might seem anachronistic, its analysis of the reexamination
statute reveals the conceptual difficulty that a Takings Clause
challenge to the AIA will likely face.
IV. Patentees’ Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations
Finally, assuming Dolin and Manta’s argument survives the
objections described above, it would arguably still fail as a matter
of takings doctrine. To determine whether a particular
governmental action effectuates a taking, courts assess “the
character of the governmental action, its economic impact, and its
interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations.”54
Thus, even assuming a government action has a significant

52. See id. at 603
Where the asserted vested right, not being linked to any substantial
equity, arises from the mistake of officers purporting to administer
the law in the name of the Government, the legislature is not
prevented from curing the defect in administration simply because
the effect may be to destroy causes of action which would otherwise
exist.” (citing Graham & Foster v. Goodcell, 282 U.S. 409, 429 (1931);
see also Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1338 (Fed. Cir.
2013) (“Like reissuance, ex parte reexamination is a curative proceeding meant
to correct or eliminate erroneously granted patents.” (citing In re Etter, 756 F.2d
852, 858 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc))).
53. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 45–47 (2011) (describing the
purposes of IPR and comparing IPR to inter partes reexamination).
54. See Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978). For the purposes of this analysis, we put aside Dolin and Manta’s
suggestion that the AIA effected a physical taking. See Dolin & Manta, supra
note 1 (manuscript at 62–64). Unlike the authors’ physical taking claim, their
regulatory taking claim does not rely on untested analogies between the
“physical” invasion of tangible and intangible property boundaries. See id.
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economic impact on protectable property,55 whether this
constitutes a taking depends on whether the affected party
should have expected that the action would occur—which, in
turn, depends on how sharply the action diverges from the
regulatory background. The Supreme Court has explained that,
at least in some circumstances involving personal property,
affected parties “ought to be aware of the possibility that new
regulation might even render [that] property economically
worthless.”56
Given these principles, it does not seem that the AIA
disrupted reasonable patentees’ expectations. The AIA is only the
latest in a series of administrative procedures authorizing parties
to offensively challenge the validity of issued patents. Congress
gave the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) authority to
perform post-issuance reexamination of issued patents over thirty
years ago and has made adjustments to this system ever since.
Specifically, Congress created ex parte reexamination in 1980,
the inter partes reexamination (the predecessor of IPR and
CBMR) in 1999, and IPR, PGR, and CBMR in 2011.57
Inter partes reexamination is the most important of these
precedents because, like IPR and CBMR, it was adversarial,
allowing for participation of the third party challenger in the

55. As noted above, many might dispute the authors’ contention that the
AIA reduced the value of patents by changing the procedures for post-issuance
review. See supra note 6. Some have argued that the challengers to the new IPR
procedures in Cuozzo, discussed below, lack standing because they cannot show
use of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard caused a redressable
injury. See Brief of Public Knowledge as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 26–28, In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 890
(2016) (No. 15-446).
56. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) (holding that
“the simple prohibition of the sale of lawfully acquired property [in this case, the
parts of protected endangered birds legally killed before the birds came under
the protection of federal statutes] does not effect a taking in violation of the
Fifth Amendment” (citing Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66–67 (1979))).
57. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, §§ 6, 18, 125
Stat. 284, 299–311, 329–31 (2011) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–19,
321–29 (2012)); Optional Inter Partes Reexamination Procedure Act of 1999,
Pub. L. No. 106-113, §§ 4601–08, 113 Stat. 1501A-567–1501A-572 (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–18 (2000)); Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96517, § 1, 94 Stat. 3015, 3015–17 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 302–07
(2012)).
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process. Dolin and Manta offer several grounds for distinguishing
IPR and CBMR from inter partes reexamination. First, the AIA
requires the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), the PTO’s
administrative tribunal, to use a “preponderance of the evidence”
standard when assessing validity, rather than the more
deferential “clear and convincing evidence” standard.58 Second,
the PTAB uses the “broadest reasonable interpretation” standard
to construe patents in IPR and CBMR proceedings; but, unlike
the prior ex partes reexamination system, the AIA offers
patentees only “limited” opportunity for amendment.59
In our view, neither of these distinctions is significant
enough to make a constitutional difference. The first distinction—
the use of a higher standard of review—is illusory. The PTO
already applied the “preponderance of the evidence” standard
when assessing patent validity in reexamination proceedings.
This should not, on its own, have been surprising.60 The second
distinction—the use of the “broadest reasonable interpretation”
standard without significant opportunity to amend—is more
compelling, especially when combined with the PTAB’s less
deferential standard of review. As a whole, this represents a
combination of patent examination and adversarial procedures
that might potentially have surprised some patentees.
But this, too, is ultimately unpersuasive. In In re Cuozzo
Speed Technologies, LLC,61 where patentees recently challenged
the PTO’s authority to use the “broadest reasonable
interpretation” standard in the new IPRs, the Federal Circuit
conceded that, under the PTO’s interpretation of the AIA,
patentees’ opportunity to amend their claims was “much more
cabined.” But the court went on to hold that the AIA’s “restriction
on amendment opportunities” did not “materially distingui[sh]
IPR proceedings from their predecessors in the patent statute,”62
58. Dolin & Manta, supra note 1 (manuscript at 21).
59. Id. (manuscript at 29–31, 58–61).
60. See In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 855–59 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc).
61. 793 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
62. Id. at 1277 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 316(d)(1)–(2) (2012)). Additionally, Dolin
and Manta’s characterization of ex parte reexamination as “not a substitute for
litigation,” Dolin & Manta, supra note 1 (manuscript at 58), is dubious given the
reexamination statute’s legislative history. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 96-1397, at 3
(1980) (“Reexamination will permit efficient resolution of questions about the
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and that its prior decisions regarding the “broadest reasonable
interpretation” standard only required amendment to be
available, not that opportunities to amend be especially liberal.63
Without taking a position on whether Cuozzo was correctly
decided, it seems highly unlikely that the Takings Clause’s
application to administrative patent proceedings could turn on
such minute differences in amendment procedures.64
To determine patentees’ reasonable expectations, courts must
also examine the broader context, to determine whether affected
parties “ought to be aware” that “new regulation” might render
their “property economically worthless.”65
Beyond third party challenges to patent validity, numerous
federal regulatory statutes limit patentees’ ability to exploit their
inventions. For example, various regulatory review statutes, such
as the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA),66 the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),67 and the
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA),68 practically reduce the
effective lifetimes of patents by prohibiting patentees from
commercially marketing or using protected products during the
review period.69 Yet none of these statutes fully compensate
patentees for these losses.70
validity of issued patents without recourse to expensive and lengthy
infringement litigation.”).
63. Cuozzo, 793 F.3d at 1277, n.7.
64. To be sure, Dolin and Manta are correct to point out the controversial
nature of the “broadest reasonable interpretation” standard. See Dolin & Manta,
supra note 1 (manuscript at 23–25, 29–31). The Supreme Court has granted
certiorari in Cuozzo to determine whether the PTO should be required to use the
“ordinary and customary meaning” standard used by courts during claim
construction. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 890 (2016) (No.
15-446). Even if the PTO is wrong to apply the “broadest reasonable
interpretation” standard, however, in our view, administrative law, not
constitutional law, provides the best justification for rejecting the PTO’s
position.
65. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
66. Pub. L. No. 75-717, § 505, 52 Stat. 1040, 1052–53 (1938) (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012)).
67. Pub. L. No. 61-152, § 3, 36 Stat. 331, 331–32 (1910) (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. § 136a (2012)).
68. Pub. L. No. 94-469, § 5, 90 Stat. 2003, 2012–20 (1976) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2604 (2012)).
69. For example, a drug manufacturer that owns several patents on a new
drug must nevertheless wait until the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
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Against this backdrop of uncompensated regulatory
devaluations of patents, it seems the AIA’s adoption of stricter
post-issuance review proceedings was in accordance with
patentees’ reasonable expectations.
Of course, Dolin and Manta might conclude that these other
examples are also takings. But this conclusion has troubling
consequences. Does Congress really need to compensate
patentees every time it passes a statute that significantly affects
the value of issued patents? Could Congress pass regulations for
the purpose of restraining bad-faith enforcement of patents that
have already been granted?71 What about judicial actions that
reduce the value of patents?72 Do they intend for Congress to
compensate patentees in these cases or to take fewer actions
limiting patent rights, simply due to the fear of effectuating a
taking? This seems like a dangerous basis on which to formulate
patent policy.
V. Conclusion
Ultimately, we believe a Takings Clause challenge to the AIA
would fail. Arguments over the AIA’s ultimate economic impact
approves its New Drug Application before selling that drug.
70. For instance, between the enactment of the FDCA in 1938 and the
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act (Hatch–Waxman Act)
in 1984, drug manufacturers received no compensation for diminutions in
effective patent lifetime caused by the FDA’s approval process. After Hatch–
Waxman, manufacturers are eligible for patent term extensions. But extensions
cannot exceed five years, and the total effective lifetime after extension cannot
exceed fourteen years. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(b), (j), (l) (2012); 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (2012)).
71. See, e.g., Consumer Protection Act, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2451–66
(2015); Bad Faith Assertions of Patent Infringement Act, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9,
§§ 4195–99 (2015); Vermont v. MPHJ Tech. Invs., LLC, 803 F.3d 635 (Fed. Cir.
2015). For discussion, see Camilla A. Hrdy, What Is Happening in Vermont?
Patent Law Reform from the Bottom Up, PATENTLY-O (May 27, 2013),
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2013/05/what-is-happening-in-vermont-patent-lawreform-from-the-bottom-up.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2016) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
72. While we only discuss legislative acts, a plethora of judicial decisions
affect validity. A plurality of the Supreme Court has held that the Takings
Clause applies to judicial actions as well as legislative ones. See Stop the Beach
Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 560 U.S. 702, 713–15
(2010).
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on patent value are necessarily speculative, and it is at least
possible that the new post-issuance proceedings significantly
devalued patents. But it cannot be denied that Dolin and Manta’s
conclusion that the AIA effectuates a taking faces significant
legal hurdles. Based on Federal Circuit and Supreme Court
precedent, patents are arguably not property under the Takings
Clause; the AIA’s creation of IPR and CBMR proceedings is
arguably not the kind of government action that constitutes a
taking; and the AIA arguably did not disrupt patentees’
reasonable
investment-backed
expectations,
given
the
background of federal statutes regulating patent rights and
patented inventions. Nevertheless, the authors’ article is a
thought-provoking and educational analysis of the constitutional
implications of Congress’s recent efforts to reform the patent
system.

